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ABSTRACT: (FIRMS’ DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE WITH IASB’S MANAGEMENT COMMENTARY FRAMEWORK: AN 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION). The continuous demand for enhanced financial reporting has highlighted the decline of the 
usefulness of traditional financial statements in satisfying the informational needs and requirements of users. Despite there being 
several points of view, many proposals revolve around the increase of narrative disclosure accompanying financial statements. It is 
apparent that the regulatory attention regarding narrative reporting has mainly focused on the Management Commentary (MC) 
report. As a result, the accounting standard setters have promoted different approaches to improve the comparability and usefulness 
of the MC among the firms. In December 2010, the IASB completed the project on the MC disclosure framework, through the 
publishing of a non-binding IFRS practice statement (IFRSps). 
The aim of this study is to analyze the information conveyed by the MC report for a sample of firms listed on the Italian Stock 
Exchange at the end of 2010. More specifically, we investigate the determinants affecting the extent of firms disclosure compliance 
with the IASB’s MC voluntary guidelines, reported in the IFRSps, soon after its implementation. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first empirical study which examines the explanatory factors affecting the extent of voluntary disclosure convergence in 
relation to IFRSps, with reference to Italy. 
To analyze the informational content of each MC report, we create an index of disclosure compliance using a self-constructed 
checklist designed on the IASB’s MC guidelines. To assess the relationship between the index of disclosure compliance and the 
firm characteristics, we use a regression model. 
Consistent with previous accounting studies, our results suggest that firm size and ownership diffusion are positively related to the 
extent of disclosure compliance with IASB’s MC guidelines. On the other hand, the leverage and profitability were found to be 
unrelated to the index of disclosure compliance. The results also show that the level of disclosure compliance to the IASB’s MC 
guidance is low, ranging from 10% to 76%, averaging 39%. This means that despite the continued demand for better 
comparability in financial reporting practices, in Italy a large number of firms do not seem to converge towards a single set of 
standards for both the narrative and numerical-financial disclosure. 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, the financial reporting model has long been debated. Academics 
and accounting policymakers have emphasized the importance of financial reporting qual-
ity, especially after several corporate scandals (DONOHER et al., 2007), in ensuring efficiency 
and transparency in capital markets (DIAMOND and VERRECCHIA, 1991; HEALY and 
PALEPU, 2001; VERRECCHIA, 2001; ASB, 2009; CICA, 2009). The continuous request for 
improved corporate disclosure has highlighted the decline of the usefulness of traditional 
financial statements in satisfying investors’ information needs (LEV and ZAROWIN, 1999; 
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ROBB et al., 2001). Despite there being several points of view, many proposals revolve 
around the narrative disclosures accompanying financial statements (BEATTIE et al., 2008). 
Recommendations from both academics (BEATTIE et al., 2004; MERKL-DAVIES and 
BRENNAN, 2007; BERETTA and BOZZOLAN, 2008) and accounting-professional policymak-
ers (ICAEW, 1999; IASB, 2010; CICA, 2009) have placed pressure on asserting an increase 
of narrative disclosures provided in the financial reporting.  
SHI YUN SEAH and TARC (2006) outline that the narrative sections of financial report-
ing, such as the management commentary (MC), are all becoming an important tool to en-
able firms to communicate with investors in capital markets. 
MERKL-DAVIES and BRENNAN (2007) point out that the corporate narrative documents 
provide the opportunity to reduce the information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders by presenting more detailed explanations. 
BEATTIE et al. (2004 and 2008) emphasize the role of narrative disclosure in achieving 
the desired step-change in the quality of corporate reporting. 
LI (2010) observes that the narrative information appears to be relevant for understand-
ing the numerical financial data and for assessing corporate decision-making. 
Globally, accounting policymakers and securities regulators have taken into account in 
their working agendas, narrative disclosure as being a relevant topic. 
In many statements, they have emphasized the role of the MC as being an important 
component of attaining a high quality of financial reporting. 
The USA Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) states:  
“We believe that management's most important responsibilities include communicating with investors in 
a clear and straightforward manner. MD&A is a critical component of that communication. The Commis-
sion has long sought through its rules, enforcement actions and interpretive processes to elicit MD&A that 
not only meets technical disclosure requirements but generally is informative and transparent” (SEC, guid-
ance). 
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) points out that:  
“It has long been recognized that financial statements alone are not sufficient to communicate overall per-
formance of an entity. Senior management, boards of directors and investors now turn to a broad array of 
information in order to explain and evaluate the overall performance and prospects of an organization. In 
particular, Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) has become a core element of the communi-
cation package for external reporting purposes” (CICA 2009, MD&A guidance, p. 7). 
In its recent IFRS practice statement (IFRSps) on MC, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) recognized the usefulness of the report being a tool used by firms 
to facilitate communication with investors. Indeed, the IASB observes: 
“For many entities, management commentary is already an important element of their communication 
with the capital markets, supplementing as well as complementing the financial statements” (IASB, 
IFRSps, p. 5). 
Our study investigates the information content conveyed through MC reporting by Ital-
ian firms. 
We focused on the determinants of the extent of disclosure compliance with the IASB’s 
MC voluntary guidelines reported in the IFRSps. 
On the basis of IASB’s MC guidelines, we developed a self-constructed disclosure 
checklist. The checklist was applied to a sample of 65 non-financial firms listed on the Ital-
ian Stock Exchange at the end of 2010. To assess the determinants of the extent of volun-
tary disclosure compliance, we adopted a regression analysis. 
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The decision to focus on the MC disclosures takes place for several reasons. First, the 
narrative disclosure is viewed as a relevant area for accounting research to test different 
economic hypothesis (Li, 2010). Second, the release of IFRSps represents a very useful op-
portunity to investigate the firm’s convergence choices towards a single set of international 
standards for narrative reporting. Finally, the lack of Italian detailed requirements for pre-
paring the MC report appears to be of interest in understanding the impact of the imple-
mentation of IASB’s MC guidelines with reference to Italy. 
Our main findings indicate that firm size and ownership diffusion are positively related 
to the extent of voluntary disclosure compliance with IFRSps. 
Our study contributes to the previous empirical literature through an investigation of 
the narrative disclosure reported in the MC section of financial reporting. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first empirical study that examines the explanatory factors affect-
ing the extent of voluntary disclosure convergence to IASB’s MC guidelines with reference 
to Italy. 
The results of our study may also be of interest to accounting policymakers and securi-
ties regulators, in order to understand the firm’s disclosure practices and to improve the 
transparency of financial reporting. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section analyses the regu-
latory background for preparing MC in Italy. Section 3 reviews the existing literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design and methodology. Section 
5 presents the results and section 6 provides the conclusions of the study. 
2. Regulatory background 
In Italy the financial reporting model is mainly affected by law (NOBES and PARKER, 
2010). Thus, the national accounting standard setter (Organismo Italiano di Contabilità – 
OIC) releases accounting standards in compliance with law requirements and/or recom-
mendations (SANNINO, 1999). 
Over the last few years, there have been crucial changes in the Italian financial reporting 
model due to the innovations, global competition and in the adoption of several European 
Directives and Regulations (POTITO and TARTAGLIA-POLCINI 2010; MACCHIONI, 2010). 
Notably, since 2005, all firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange have been required to 
prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IAS/IFRS principles. 
On the other hand, article 2428 of the Civil Code requires all firms, both listed and 
unlisted, to prepare the MC - called Relazione sulla Gestione, as a part of their financial report-
ing.  
Academics agree that the MC is a narrative and supplementary report, whose purpose is 
to assist users in better assessing of the firm’s performance and prospects (Bagnoli and Ve-
dovato, 2004; Bruni, 2007; Viganò, 2008; Caldarelli, 2010). 
Article 2428 of the Civil Code has been modified by different European Directives (Di-
rective n. 660/1978, Directive n. 349/1983 and Directive n. 51/2003). The  European Di-
rective n. 51/2003 adopted in Italy through the legislative decree 32/2007 has extended the 
content of MC, requiring a new range of information, i.e. risks, financial and non-financial 
performance indicators and the disclosure on the environment and employees. The new 
disclosure requirements have become effective for all firms since fiscal year 2008.  
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The new version of article 2428 requires firms to provide a description of the following 
main topics: 
 
1. regulatory and economic environments in which the firm or its subsidiaries operate; 
2. review of operations; 
3. revenues and capital expenditures; 
4. research and development activities; 
5. inter-firm relationships; 
6. the number and nominal value of both own shares and parent firms ones; 
7. the number and nominal value of own shares, as well as shares of subsidiaries firms bought or 
transferred in the fiscal year; 
8. the significant events occurring after the fiscal year-end closing; 
9. corporate governance structure; 
10. financial instruments; 
11. the list of the sub-offices of the firm; 
12. outlook information; 
13. financial and non-financial performance indicators; 
14. risks and uncertainties; 
15. environment and employee information. 
 
Despite the above mentioned initiatives, Italian preparers still have discretion to choose 
the amount and the type of information to report in the MC. Therefore, in the absence of 
detailed compilation procedures, the information content of the Italian MC can be consid-
ered mostly voluntary (QUAGLI, 2004; GIUNTA and PISANI, 2006). 
However, additional information is required from listed firms, by the Italian Securities 
and Exchange Commission (CONSOB). For example, statement nr. 6064293 has a re-
quirement to include in the MC report: 
 reclassified financial statements adopted to  evaluate a firm’s performance; 
 the description of atypical or unusual operations generated over the years; 
 information related to “alternative performance indicators” (for example, EBIT, EBITDA, Net 
Financial position, CAPEX), which are different from the traditional performance measures. 
 
In 2009, to improve comparability among Italian firms, the Italian Institute of Account-
ants (Consiglio Nazionale Dottori Commercialisti ed Esperti Contabili – CNDCEC) issued 
a voluntary guidance to support the directors in preparing their MC. The guidance provides 
several recommendations and indications, especially relating to the new set of disclosure 
which is required by the European Directive n. 51/2003. 
In December 2010, IASB completed the project on MC, through the publishing of 
non-binding IFRSps. The issuing of the IASB’s MC guidelines stems from the aim to im-
prove comparability across all firms which apply IAS/IFRS principles, thereby enhancing 
the usefulness of financial reporting. Thus, since the fiscal year 2010, IAS/IFRS adopters, 
could use the same set of standards for narrative reporting as well as financial statements. 
Following comments received and the project team’s discussions, IASB defined MC in 
IFRSps as:  
“…narrative report that provides a context within which to interpret the financial position, financial 
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performance and cash flows of an entity. It also provides management with an opportunity to explain its 
objectives and its strategies for achieving those objectives. Users routinely use the type of information provided 
in management commentary to help them evaluate an entity’s prospects and its general risks, as well as the 
success of management’s strategies for achieving its stated objectives narrative document, included in annual 
report and integrated with financial statements, whose aim is to present the management’s view on the strate-
gies of the company, the financial condition and the financial performance.” (IASB, IFRSps p. 5). 
The IFRSps provides an informative framework for the preparers, that can be divided 
in two main sections: 
 principles, users and qualitative characteristics of MC; 
 the information content of the MC.  
The principles 
The MC disclosure is required to be in line with the following principles: 
 to provide the management’s view of the entity’s performance, position and progress; and 
 to supplement and complement information presented in the financial statements. 
 
According to these principles, the MC should include: 
 forward-looking information;  
 information with the qualitative characteristics described in the Conceptual Framework for Finan-
cial Reporting. 
 
Despite different opinions, the IASB has also solved the problem relating to MC 
placement, establishing that this report is within the boundaries of financial reporting and, 
therefore, its users and qualitative characteristics are driven by the aim of the new concep-
tual framework for financial reporting. 
Users 
According to the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, the main users of 
MC are actual and potential investors, lenders and creditors.  
Qualitative characteristics 
To be aligned with the aims of Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, the dis-
closure provided in the MC should possess the fundamental qualitative characteristics of 
relevance and faithful representation and enhancing characteristics, such as comparability, verifiabil-
ity, timeliness and understandability. 
Content of  the MC 
IFRSps does not require a detailed scheme or content for the MC, but indicate the main 
reporting sections which a functional management report should include. 
The five key reporting sections as indicated in IFRSps are reported in the table 1. 
 
Table 1 - IFRSps reporting sections 
A.  The nature of the business 
B.  Management’s objectives and its strategies for meeting those objectives
C.  The entity’s most significant resources, risks and relationships
D.  The results of operations and prospects
E.  The critical performance measures and indicators that management uses to evaluate the entity’s performance against stated objectives 
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3. Prior research and hypotheses 
In academic literature, narrative corporate disclosure has been investigated in various 
ways. However, at last three different approaches can be identified: i) the natural language 
processing approach (DAVIS and TAMA-SWEET, 2012; LEAVY et al., 2011); ii) modification 
disclosure score based on algorithm (BROWN and TUCKER, 2011); and iii) disclosure indeces 
and content analysis (BEATTIE et al., 2004; PRENCIPE, 2004; SHI YUN SEAH and TARC, 
2006; BERETTA and BOZZOLAN, 2004 and 2008).  
 
The natural language processing approach 
Over the last few years, the natural language processing approach has become highly 
popular in accounting research. Recent studies have examined the readability aspects (de-
terminants and effects in capital markets) of corporate reports and the managers’ choice of 
optimistic or pessimistic language (tone). 
LEAVY et al. (2011), using the Fog index, analyzed the effect of the readability of 10-K 
filing of a large sample of firms on the behavior of sell-side financial analysts. They found 
that analysts exert greater effort to cover firms with less readable communication. In addi-
tion, they found that the less readable 10-K reports are more informative to investors, but 
at the same time are associated to greater dispersion, lower accuracy, and higher levels of 
uncertainty in analyst earnings forecasts. 
On the other hand, DAVIS and TAMA-SWEET (2012) analyzed the managers’ language 
tone used in earnings press releases and in the MC report, for a large sample of firms be-
tween 1998 and 2003. Their main results provide evidence that managers use lower levels 
of pessimistic language and higher levels of optimistic language in earnings press releases 
rather than to the MC report.  
 
Modification disclosure score 
Taking a different approach, BROWN and TUCKER (2011) introduced to accounting lit-
erature, a methodology to measure year-over-year changes in narrative reporting. They ap-
plied to a large sample of firms, a tool of disclosure modification score based on an algo-
rithm used by internet search engines to examine similarities between documents. The re-
sults indicate that firms with larger economic changes modify the MC disclosures more 
than the firms with smaller economic changes. In addition, they found that the MC disclo-
sures score is not associated to the analyst earnings forecast revisions. 
 
Disclosure indeces and content analysis 
A large number of studies have examined the determinants and the consequences of 
narrative disclosure provided by the firms, using the disclosure indeces and content analysis 
(KRIPPENDORF, 1980; HOOKS and MOON, 1993; BERETTA and BOZZOLAN, 2004; BEATTIE 
et al., 2004; KOTARI et al., 2009).  
Consistent with this strand of literature, our paper aims to investigate the factors affect-
ing Italian firms in extending the voluntary disclosure compliance with IASB’s MC frame-
work. 
In academic literature, the construction of  disclosure indeces is viewed as a way that 
can assist the researchers to measure the extent (or amount) of disclosure provided in firms 
annual report documents (MARSTON and SHRIVES, 1991). The selection of items to be in-
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cluded in the index is generally guided by the creation of the checklist based on the manda-
tory requirements or voluntary guidelines relating to financial reporting content (BEATTIE et 
al., 2004). To identify the items to be included in the index, researchers have used a content 
analysis technique, especially to analyze narrative information. 
Two kinds of disclosure indeces, i.e. weighted and unweighted, have been widely used 
in accounting studies. 
The weighted disclosure index uses a different weight for every item (or group of 
items), which is representative of the relative importance of each of them (MEEK et al., 
1995; SINGHVI and DESAI, 1971; BUZBY, 1975; BOTOSAN, 1997). 
The unweighted disclosure index considers all items having the same relevance 
(COOKE, 1989 and 1992; WALLACE et al., 1994) and its score indicates the percentage of 
their presence in the examined documents. 
The relationship between the extent of corporate disclosure, measured by a disclosure 
index, and firm characteristics, has been investigated in many empirical accounting studies. 
COOKE (1989), using a disclosure index, analyzed the extent of disclosure provided in 
the annual reports of 90 Swedish firms, listed and unlisted. He found a significant associa-
tion between the firm’s size and the extent of corporate disclosure. 
WALLACE et al. (1994) examined the characteristics of the firm that were likely to ex-
plain the “comprehensiveness” of the financial disclosure in the annual reports for a sample 
of 50 Spanish firms. The authors analyzed the corporate disclosure by an index of 16 man-
datory disclosure items. The findings provide evidence that the disclosure index, firm size 
and the listing status, were found to be significantly associated. 
PRENCIPE (2004), using two different disclosure indeces, investigated the segment dis-
closure of 64 firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange at the end of 1997. The results 
provide evidence that the correspondence between the segments and legally identifiable 
sub-groups of firms and the listing status age were noteworthy in relation to the extent of 
segment disclosure.  
Several other characteristics of the firm are pointed out in literature, such as profitabil-
ity, leverage and ownership structure, in order to explain the reasons for which firms in-
crease the amount of disclosure (MCKINNON and DALIMUNTHE, 1993; RAFFOURNIER, 
1995; AHMED and COURTIS, 1999; HANNIFFA and COOKE, 2002; AJIKYA et al., 2005; 
GARCIA -MECA and SANCHEZ-BALLESTA, 2010; FITO et al., 2012). 
Within the set of studies on narrative disclosure, during the last decades, researchers 
have increased their efforts on investigating the MC report.  
HOOKS and MOON (1993) analyzed the disclosure compliance of MC provided by a 
sample of USA firms with SEC’s rules. They developed a list of 60 items based on the SEC 
regulation to analyze the compliance of MC with post-FRR 36 disclosure requirements. 
They found that firms appear to have responded to the FRR 36 issue by increasing their 
disclosure.  
BARRON et al. (1999) investigated the relationships between properties of analysts’ earn-
ings forecasts and MD&A quality. The quality of MC was measured by the level of compli-
ance with the SEC’s MC standards. They found that high MD&A ratings are associated 
with less error and less dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
COLE and JONES (2004) analyzed the usefulness of several MC disclosures using a sam-
ple of 160 firms in the retail industry for 1996 to 1999. They found that the information on 
revenue changes (i.e. comparable store sales growth, store openings, and store closings and 
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future capital expenditures planned store openings and capital expenditures) have an ex-
planatory power in predicting future revenues and future earnings and also contemporane-
ous stock returns beyond the information contained in financial statements. 
HOLDER-WEBB (2007) developed a new tool for evaluating the qualitative information 
contained in the MC section. The tool yields a quantitative measure of disclosure that can 
be used in a variety of empirical or experimental research, including as a dependent or in-
dependent variable in regression analysis. 
Despite the large amount of international studies, few empirical researches have been 
developed for analyzing the narrative sections of financial reporting with reference to Italy.  
Some of these provide interesting results. 
BERETTA and BOZZOLAN (2004), using an adjusted quantity index that incorporates 
richness of  information content, investigated the risk disclosure provided in the MC re-
ports of  all non-financial firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange at the end of  2001. 
The main findings suggested that the index of  risk disclosure quantity is not affected either 
by size or industry type. 
BERETTA and BOZZOLAN (2008) analyzed the impact of  forward-looking information, 
during the period 1999-2001, in the revision of  analyst’s earnings forecasts for a sample of  
85 non-financial firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange at the end of  2001. The findings 
provide evidence that the measure of  disclosure quality has a positive association with accu-
racy, and a negative association with the dispersion of  financial analysts’ earnings forecasts 
rather than merely a simple index of  disclosure quantity.  
SILVI and BARTOLINI (2011), using a content analysis methodology, examined the dis-
closure of key performance indicators provided in MC reports for a sample of 111 firms of 
different European countries. The findings suggest that a large number of firms did not 
disclose an effective and balanced picture of the drivers that will lead their future perform-
ance. 
 
This study examines the information content of MC in order to identify the firm char-
acteristics affecting the extent of voluntary disclosure compliance with IFRSps. Consistent 
with the previous empirical studies, we believe that the firm size, leverage, profitability and 
ownership structure are the most common explanatory factors of the extent of voluntary 
disclosure compliance. Thus, we developed the following hypotheses. 
 
Size.  Size is the most popular independent variable used in empirical studies to explain 
the extent of disclosure provided by the firms (SCHIPPER, 1981; WALLACE et al., 1994; 
ROBB et al., 2001; PRENCIPE, 2004). SINGHVI and DESAI (1971) identified three main rea-
sons to explain the influence of size on corporate disclosure. Firstly, large firms compared 
to small ones, can better afford the expenses relating to the external reporting of detailed 
information. Secondly, large firms are motivated to provide more information in order to 
obtain benefits in securities market and an easier access to external financing. Thirdly, small 
firms are likely to provide less information to avoid the loss of their competitive advantage. 
On the other hand, LANG and LUNDHOLM (1993) suggest that a fixed component of the 
cost of disclosure may be decreased in increasing of unit of firm size. INCAHUSTI (1997) 
indicates that larger firms are involved in major potential conflicts among stakeholders. 
Thus they tend to extend the corporate disclosure to mitigate the information asymmetries 
and agency costs. COOKE (1989) supports the argument that the larger firms are involved 
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in complex business activities and, thereby, they are required to provide more detailed in-
formation to the external users. 
Academics also argue that large firms may extend corporate disclosure because they are 
more exposed than the smaller ones to the pressure of various stakeholders (WALLACE et 
al., 1994; WALLACE and NASER, 1995; SCHIPPER, 1981). Many empirical researches have 
found a positive relationship between firm size and the extent of corporate disclosures 
(COOKE, 1989; RAFFOURNIER, 1995; FITO et al., 2012). In this study we used as firm size 
variable the natural logarithm of total assets (WALLACE et al., 1994; INCHAUSTI, 1997). Thus, we 
expect that the size of firms has a positive influence on the extent of voluntary compliance 
with IASB’s MC guidelines.  Hence our first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: The extent of the voluntary disclosure compliance with IASB's MC guidelines is 
positively related to a firm size. 
 
Profitability. The influence of profitability on the firm’s disclosure practices could be ex-
plained by different arguments. First, the firms with high profitability may be encouraged to 
disclose additional information to reduce information asymmetries with investors to avoid 
the adverse selection process (MCNICHOLS, 1984; DYE, 1985; LANG and LUNDHOLM, 
1993). Indeed, many authors observe that firms with high level of profitability, compared 
with low profitability ones, are interested to extend the corporate disclosure to avoid an 
undervaluation of their shares and to assure the market on the stability of their financial 
results (SINGHVI and DESAI, 1971; INCAHUSTI, 1997). In addition, the managers of the high 
profitability firms could be motivated to extend voluntary disclosure to promote a positive 
impression of their management’s ability and skills in capital markets (HEALY and PALEPU, 
2001). Other strands of studies have investigated the influence of firm performance on the 
specific properties (or qualities) of corporate disclosure. SUBRAMANIAN et al. (1993) and LI 
(2008) indicate that firms with a high level of performance, compared to low level perform-
ance ones, tend to improve the quality of disclosure, through reports which are easier to 
read for users. On the basis of the above considerations, it can be expected that firms with 
high levels of profitability are likely to provide more information than firms with lower or 
bad profitability. However, the empirical results on the relationships between profitability 
and the extent of disclosure appear heterogeneous (WALLACE et al., 1994). Indeed, there are 
empirical studies which have found a positive relationship between profitability and the 
level of corporate disclosure (WALLACE and NASER, 1995; INCHAUSTI, 1997), whilst others 
have reported no significant relationship at all (MEEK et al., 1995; MALONE et al., 1993; 
LEUZ, 1999). Although many empirical accounting studies have used different types of 
profitability ratio, such as net profit/net sales, operating income/total assets, net income/equity, operat-
ing income divided by total assets (INCHAUSTI, 1997; SINGHVI and DESAI, 1971; PRENCIPE, 
2004), in this study we measured firm profitability as earnings before tax/total sales (WALLACE 
et al., 1994). Therefore, we expect that the level of profitability has a positive influence on 
the extent of voluntary disclosure compliance with IASB’s MC guidelines. Hence our sec-
ond hypothesis is: 
H2: The extent of the voluntary disclosure compliance with IASB’s MC guidelines is 
positively related to a firm’s profitability. 
Leverage. The leverage may be considered as one of  structure-related variables that could af-
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fect the amount of  information provided by the firms (WALLACE et al., 1994; HANIFFA and 
COOKE, 2004). Specifically, it has been argued that the firms with high levels of  leverage 
(such as gearing ratio) may be motivated to disclose additional and voluntary information in 
order to satisfy the needs of  lenders and creditors, and also to enhance their chance of  ac-
quiring external financing (WALLACE et al., 1994).  
The arguments to support such hypothesis come from the agency costs related to the 
relationships between stockholders and creditors. In this case, the firms with higher propor-
tion of  external financing have higher agency costs due to the demand for external financial 
reporting as a form of  monitoring. RAFFOURNIER (1995) indicates that financial disclosure 
in annual reports can mitigate monitoring problems between stockholders and creditors 
and reduce agency costs.  Therefore, it is expected that highly leveraged firms are motivated 
to extend the corporate disclosure through voluntary provision of  additional information 
(DEPOERS, 2000). 
However, the empirical studies regarding the relationship between leverage and the level 
of  corporate disclosure provide mixed evidence. Some studies found a positive relationship 
between the level of  leverage and the amount disclosure (MALONE et al., 1993; GINER et al., 
1997; FRANCIS et al., 2008), while others reported no significant relationship (HOSSAIN et 
al., 1994; RAFFOURNIER, 1995; FITO et. al., 2012). According to similar studies (Wallace et 
al., 1994), the leverage was measured as the ratio of a firm’s total long-term debt to its outstanding 
equity. 
Thus, we believe that the leverage could have a positive impact on the extent of volun-
tary disclosure compliance to IASB’s MC guidelines. Hence our third hypothesis is: 
H3: The extent of the voluntary disclosure compliance with IASB’s MC guidelines is 
positively related to the leverage. 
Ownership diffusion. The ownership structure is one of the corporate governance mecha-
nisms that could affect the extent of firm’s voluntary disclosure (GARCIA-MECA and 
SANCHEZ-BALLESTA, 2010). In accounting literature, authors indicate that a large portion of 
shares spread throughout capital market increases the separation between managers and 
investors and creates agency costs (DEPOERS, 2000; PRENCIPE, 2004). Indeed, firms with a 
wider number of shares spread in capital markets may be subjected to the pressure of 
shareholders in disclosing additional information. On this point, COOKE (1989) observes 
that when there are a relevant number of shareholders, the firm is required to satisfy diver-
sity information needs with greater disclosure. Furthermore, by providing extended infor-
mation, managers could mitigate the conflicts with investors, obtaining the reduction of 
agency costs. RAFFOURNIER (1995) outlines that the presence of a relevant number of small 
shareholders creates a strong interested in a firm’s annual report, which is the main and less 
expensive source of information to monitor the behavior of managers. Thus, the firms 
whose ownership is widespread throughout the capital market have a pressure to extend the 
information reported in their annual reports to support the small shareholders in better in-
vestment decision-making. Different empirical studies support the positive influence of 
ownership diffusion on the extent of corporate disclosure (MCKINNON and DALIMUNTHE, 
1993; LEUZ, 1999). However, RAFFOURNIER (1995) found no association between the ex-
tent of voluntary disclosure in Swiss firms disclosure and ownership diffusion. As in previ-
ous studies (RAFFOURNIER, 1995; PRENCIPE, 2004), we calculated the ownership diffusion as 
the percentage of share capital owned by unknown shareholders.  
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Therefore, we believe that firms with a high level of shares, widespread in the capital 
market, are more likely to voluntarily comply with IASB’s MC guidelines. Thus, our four 
hypothesis is: 
H4: The extent of the voluntary disclosure compliance with IASB’s MC guidelines is 
positively related to the ownership diffusion. 
4. Research design  
4.1 Sample 
Our sample was selected from the non-financial firms listed at the end of  2010 on the 
Italian Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana s.p.a.). Similar to previous studies, the financial listed 
firms were excluded, as they are subjected to specific disclosure requirements (PRENCIPE, 
2004; BERETTA and BOZZOLAN, 2004 and 2008).  
The firms were chosen using a random sample, assuming a level of reliability equal to 
95% and a confidence interval of 10%. The sample consists of 65 firms (see appendix 1) 
and it represents 32,50% of the entire population of the non-financial firms listed at the end 
of  2010. 
The decision to consider the 2010 MC report was due to the fact that this is the first 
fiscal year where the IFRSps were available for the preparers. Thus, all IAS/IFRS adopters 
were encouraged to apply the IASB’s MC guidelines starting from the fiscal year 2010. The 
MC was extracted from the annual report published on the web site of each listed firm. We 
focused our analysis on the information content of each MC report. 
4.2 Variables measurement 
Dependent variable. In academic literature, different empirical studies show that the adop-
tion of both weighted and unweighted disclosure indeces tend to generate significant and 
analogous results (FIRTH, 1980; ROBBINS and AUSTIN, 1986; PRENCIPE, 2004). However, 
like COOKE (1989, 1992) and RAFFOURNIER (1995), in our study the extent of voluntary 
disclosure compliance with IFRSps is measured by an unweighted disclosure index1, where 
it assumed each item as being equally important (COOKE 1989 and 1992). The index is 
composed of 21 disclosure items identified in our checklist (see appendix 2) designed on 
IASB’s MC disclosure recommendations. The disclosure items can be applied to all firms 
included in the sample. The score of disclosure index indicates the level of the extent of 
disclosure compliance to the IFRSps.  
To calculate the disclosure index score we followed a ‘dichotomous’ approach: 
if a firm discloses an item included in the checklist, it was assigned a score of “1” (one) 
and of “0” (zero) if it was not disclosed. 
 
The index of disclosure compliance can be shown as follows:  
 
 
 
____________  
(1) In this study we use the disclosure checklist adopted in previous empirical research (Ginesti et al., 2013). 
 
 
Dc = 6  di
i=1 
m 
 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI RAGIONERIA E DI ECONOMIA AZIENDALE - LUGLIO - AGOSTO - SETTEMBRE 2013 705 
where: 
 d = is the score of each disclosure item (“1” or “0”); 
 m = is the maximum number of  disclosure items (“21”) expected to be disclosed by 
firms in compliance with IFRSps.  
Thereby, Dc expresses the degree of  disclosure compliance to IFRSps provided by Ital-
ian listed firms in their MC.  
To identify the presence or absence of each item in the MC report, we applied a manual 
content analysis. The content analysis methodology required several steps (KRIPPENDORFF, 
1980; WEBER, 1985; BEATTIE et al., 2004; BERETTA and BOZZOLAN, 2004; SEAH and TARC, 
2006).  
We first converted the MC of each firm from the PDF format in TXT file, removing all 
graphs, tables and images. We divided the overall content of MC in sections to align it to 
the five reporting areas identified by IFRSps. We defined the coding rules to determine the 
sentences and/or the themes that were related to the items included in the checklist. We 
tested the checklist on five firms included in the sample and we identified the final coding 
rules to be applied to all MC reports. One researcher has been involved in the analysis to 
avoid problems of coding rules among different researchers (stability). To ensure the reli-
ability of the coding process, the researcher applied the checklist to the information content 
of all MC reports, in two different times. The results of the two classifications were subse-
quently compared and the identified misalignments were removed after the discussion 
among all authors. The accuracy of the analysis was ensured by using a disclosure checklist 
created on the basis of the recommendations reported in IFRSps. 
Independent variables 
We categorized  the independent variables (WALLACE et al., 1994; HANNIFFA and 
COOKE, 2002) in:  
 corporate governance variables (ownership diffusion); and 
 firm-specific variables (profitability, leverage, size).  
 
The three firm-specific variables were measured using the data obtained from the 2010 
consolidated financial statements reported in annual firm reports, while the corporate govern-
ance variable (ownership diffusion) was measured using the CONSOB data-set. 
The table 2 describes how the independent variables are measured. 
 
Table 2 - Independent variables measurement 
Variable Measurement Source 
TASSETS Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of 2010 
Annual report 2010 
LEVERAGE 
The ratio of a firm's total long-term 
debt to its outstanding equity at the 
end of 2010 
Annual report 2010 
PROFIT The ratio of earnings before tax to total sales at the end of 2010 
Annual report 2010 
OWNERDIFF 
Percentage of shares owned by share-
holders, who possess less than 2% of 
the share capital at the end of 2010 
CONSOB data-base 2010 
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4.3 Method 
To assess the relationship between the Dc, as dependent variables, and the firm charac-
teristics, as independent variables, we used an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
model. The regression equation is the following:  
Dc =E0 + E1 TASSETS+E2 OWNERDIFF +E3 PROFIT +E4 LEVERAGE +HL
where: 
Dc = Index of Disclosure Compliance 
TASSETS = Natural logarithm of total assets as firm size 
OWNERDIFF = Ownership Diffusion 
PROFIT = Profitability 
LEVERAGE = Gearing Ratio 
HL = Error Term 
5. Results 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistical analysis (the minimum, maximum, mean and 
standard deviation for all the considered variables).  
The results show that the extent of disclosure compliance with IASB’s MC guidelines 
provided by Italian listed firms ranges from 10% to 76% with an average of 39%. These 
results mean that a large amount of firms included in our sample did not comply with the 
IASB’s MC guidelines. As reported in the table 3, the difference between the mean and the 
median are not particularly relevant for the most of the variables considered in the analysis. 
The highest difference has been found for the leverage.  
 
Table 3 - Descriptive statistics 
VARIABLE Nr. of obser-
vations 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dc 65 0.39 0.33 0.167 0.1 0.76 
TASSETS 65 2.81 2.76 0.806 1.08 4.95 
OWNERDIFF 65 0.34 0.31 0.149 0.1 0.8 
LEVERAGE 65 1.05 0.77 1.868 -1.48 13.87 
PROFIT 65 0.03 0.04 0.155 -0.68 0.54 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. Dc is the index of disclosure compliance. TASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets at 
the end of 2010. OWNERDIFF is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders, who possess less than 2% of the share capital at the end of 2010. 
PROFIT  is the ratio of earnings before tax to total sales at the end of 2010. LEVERAGE is the ratio of a firm’s total long-term debt to its out-
standing equity at the end of 2010.
 
The correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables is reported in table 
4. The results show that the firm size (TASSETS), ownership diffusion (OWNERDIFF) 
and the profitability (PROFIT) are correlated with the index of disclosure compliance. On 
the other hand, the leverage (LEVERAGE) does not appear to be correlated with the index 
of disclosure compliance. As would be expected, the ownership diffusion is positively cor-
related with the firm size.  
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Table 4 – Correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables 
 Dc TASSETS PROFIT GEARING MARKET 
Dc 1  
TASSETS 0.548* 1  
PROFIT 0.353* 0.463* 1  
LEVERAGE -0.039 -0.071 -0.191 1  
OWNERDIFF 0.506* 0.322* 0.211 -0.107 1 
*Correlations coefficients significant at the 5% or better 
This table shows the correlation matrix for all variables. Dc is the index of disclosure compliance. TASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets at 
the end of 2010. OWNERDIFF is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders, who possess less than 2% of the share capital at the end of 2010. 
PROFIT is the ratio of earnings before tax to total sales at the end of 2010. LEVERAGE is the ratio of a firm’s total long-term debt to its out-
standing equity at the end of 2010.
 
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, we tested the existence of collinearity 
among the independent variables. 
The multicollinearity was analyzed using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) index. 
Multicollinearity occurs when some predictors of the model are highly correlated and 
typically are redundant. VIF (mean variance inflation factor) and 1/VIF (or tolerance) are 
both used in order to measure the relevance of the multicollinearity in the regression analy-
sis (Verbeek, 2008). The level of tolerance 1/VIF is considered as the degree of collinearity. 
The table 5 reports the results of the VIF index. The results did not provide empirical 
evidence of a serious problem of high collinearity among the independent variables. 
 
Table 5 - Testing for multicollinearity 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES VIF 1/VIF (Tolerance) 
TASSETS 1.37 0.731 
OWNERDIFF 1.13 0,885 
LEVERAGE 1.04 0.957 
PROFIT 1.32 0.757 
MEAN VIF 1.22  
This table shows the Testing for multicollinearity. Dc is the index of disclosure compliance. TASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
end of 2010. OWNERDIFF is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders, who possess less than 2% of the share capital at the end of 2010. 
PROFIT is the ratio of earnings before tax to total sales at the end of 2010. LEVERAGE is the ratio of a firm’s total long-term debt to its out-
standing equity at the end of 2010.
 
Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis (standardized beta, coefficients, t-
statistics, and probability levels are provided for each independent variable). The OLS re-
gression produced an F-ratio of 11.39 and adjusted R2 of approximately of 39%. 
The empirical evidences indicate that the coefficient of firm size, measured as a natural 
logarithm of total assets, is significantly positive (p < 0.001) related to the index of volun-
tary disclosure compliance. This implies that the extent of disclosure compliance with 
IFRSps grows with the size of the Italian listed firm. These results confirm our first hy-
pothesis and are similar to previous empirical studies (WALLACE et al., 1994; WALLACE and 
NASER, 1995; COOKE, 1989; HANIFFA and COOKE, 2002).  
The results of the model also show that the coefficient of ownership diffusion is both 
significantly and positively related to the index of voluntary disclosure compliance (p< 
0.001). These findings confirm our fourth hypothesis and suggest that the firms with a high 
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level of share spread in the capital market tend to provide more information in compliance 
with IASB’s MC guidelines. These results are also consistent with previous empirical studies 
(LEUZ, 1999; PRENCIPE, 2004). 
Consistent with previous studies (RAFFOURNIER, 1995; WALLACE et al.,1994; FITO et 
al., 2012), the other two proposed determinants (leverage and profitability,) do not appear to 
explain the voluntary disclosure compliance choices of Italian listed firms. Thus, the second 
and the third hypothesis do not find empirical support. 
In summary, we found that firm size and ownership diffusion can be identified as the 
main explanatory factors that affected the extent of voluntary disclosure compliance with 
IFRSps, provided by the Italian listed firms.  
This means that with reference to Italy, where there are many smaller size firms, it can 
be expected that, despite the mandatory adopting of the IAS/IFRS principles, a large 
amount of listed firms, could not comply with the IASB guidelines for the preparation of 
MC. 
 
Table 6 - Regression results: OLS estimation 
Disclosure Coef. Std. Error T p>t  
TASSETS 0.079 0.023 3.38   0.001   
OWNERDIFF 0.407 0.115 3.52    0.001   
LEVERAGE 0.004 0.008 0.48 0.634   
PROFIT 0.115 0.120 0.95 0.344   
CONS 0.019 0.069 0.28 0.778   
Source Sum of  Squares Df Mean square  
Model 0.770 4 0.192  
Residual 1.015 60 0.016  
Total 1.785 64 0.027  
This table shows the regression results. Dc is the index of disclosure compliance. TASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of 
2010. OWNERDIFF is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders, who possess less than 2% of the share capital at the end of 2010. 
PROFIT is the ratio of earnings before tax to total sales at the end of 2010. LEVERAGE is the ratio of a firm’s total long-term debt to its 
outstanding equity at the end of 2010. 
 
The model has been verified for heteroscedasticity. One of the relevant assumptions of 
the econometric model used in this study is the homogeneity of variance of the residuals. 
We used the Cameron-Trivedi’s decomposition of IM-test and Breusch Pagan-Cook Weis-
berg test. We didn’t find evidence of heteroscedasticity. Both tests are sensitive to the as-
sumption of normality.  
We have also considered the kernel density estimate of the residuals to check the nor-
mality of the residuals. The results indicate that the normality of the residuals seem to be 
empirically reasonable. Further negative evidence is also obtained by using the Shapiro-
Wilk.  
5.1. Robustness check 
We tested the regression model used in this study with additional tests, in order to 
check the robustness of the results. 
First, we excluded one outlier from the sample, identified on the basis of overall meas-
ures of influence (Cook’s D and Difference in Fits DFITS). In this case, we did not find 
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any statistically significant differences with the results of the model without outliers (see 
table 7). 
 
Table 7 - OLS estimation results without outlier 
Disclosure Coef. Std. Error T p>t 
TASSETS 0.076 0.023 3.23 0.002 
OWNERDIFF 0.413 0.115 3.57 0.001 
LEVERAGE 0.019 0.017 1.11 0.272 
PROFIT 0.135 0.122 1.11 0.273 
CONS 0.013 0.069 0.19 0.849 
R2 0.437  
Adjusted R2 0.399  
F= 11.49  
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000  
Root MSE 0.130  
Source Sum of  Squares Df Mean square 
Model 0.777 4 0.194 
Residual 0.998 59 0.016 
Total 1.775 63 0.028 
This table shows the regression results without outlier. Dc is the index of disclosure compliance. TASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets 
at the end of 2010. OWNERDIFF is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders, who possess less than 2% of the share capital at the end of 
2010. PROFIT is the ratio of earnings before tax to total sales at the end of 2010. LEVERAGE is the ratio of a firm’s total long-term debt to 
its outstanding equity at the end of 2010.
 
Second, we used other common specification for firm size (measured as natural loga-
rithm of total sales) and considered two popular determinants used in accounting studies as 
explanatory factors of corporate disclosure, i.e. the auditor firm type (measured  as “1” if 
the firm is audited by one of the big four auditors otherwise as “0”) and institutional inves-
tors (calculated as the number of institutional investors who possess more than 2 of the 
share capital at the end of 2010), but the main effects represented in our model results did 
not show any significant changes. The results are reported in table 8. 
6. Discussions and conclusions 
This paper investigates the content included in the MC report for a sample of non-
financial firms listed at the end of 2010 on the Italian Stock Exchange. 
Our study makes a contribution to the existing literature by showing which factors af-
fected the Italian listed firms in extending the voluntary disclosure compliance with the 
IASB’s MC guidelines, soon after its implementation. 
Our results could be also of interest for regulatory securities and accounting standard 
setters in order to identify new approaches to ensure a better comparability of narrative dis-
closure amongst firms. 
We analyzed the information content of the MC using a self-constructed checklist 
guided by IFRSps disclosure recommendations. The evidence found in this study shows 
interesting results. 
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Table 8 - Alternative model specifications 
VARIABLE MODEL  1 
MODEL 
 2 
MODEL  
3 
MODEL 
 4 
MODEL  
5 
MODEL  
6 
TASSETS    0.079**    0.072**  0.066*    
PROFIT 0.115 0.106 0.113 0.135 0.127 0.136 
LEVERAGE 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
OWNERDIFF     0.407***    0.397**    0.392**      0.450***    0.436***     0.426*** 
INV_IST  0.015 0.014  0.015 0.015 
AUDIT   0.018   0.028 
TSALES      0.065**  0.057* 0.514 
CONS 0.019 0.033 0.032 0.057 0.070 0.648 
    
N 65 65 64 65 65 64 
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.390 0.363 0.377 0.373 0.348 
R2 0.431 0.437 0.423 0.416 0.422 0.410 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
     First, in the Italian context, the amount of voluntary disclosure provided by the firms in 
compliance with IASB’s MC guidelines appears to be low. However, the low level of com-
pliance could be due to the limited time elapsed from the release of IASB’s MC guidelines 
and the publication of the firm’s annual report for the fiscal year 2010. For these reasons, 
we expect that the level of compliance with IASB’s guidelines should increase over the 
years. Consistent with previous empirical studies, the regression analysis provides evidence 
that size and ownership diffusion are the main determinants of the extent of voluntary dis-
closure. Indeed, the relationships between the index of disclosure compliance with firm size 
and ownership diffusion were found to be significantly positive. Therefore, the release of 
non-binding IFRSps does not appear to encourage smaller size listed firms to comply with 
international recommendations. This means that in Italy, a large amount of firms do not 
converge towards a single set of principles in preparing their financial reporting, thus reduc-
ing the comparability and usefulness of narrative reporting accompanying financial state-
ments.  
In Italian context the association between size and disclosure could be explained by dif-
ferent reasons as identified in exiting literature. Firstly, the large Italian firms are able to 
manage the cost relating to the extended information due to the existence of internal or-
ganization reporting system. Secondly, the large Italian firms have a consolidated competi-
tive advantage that should not be compromised by the increasing of disclosure in annual 
report. Thirdly, the Italian large firms have a high level of international business activities 
and in some cases are cross-listed. These conditions imply a wider range of stakeholders 
which leads to various information needs to satisfy.  
The second explanatory variable of the level of disclosure has been identified in owner-
ship diffusion. This variable has an explanatory power also in the Italian context where the 
listed firms are in many cases family controlled, without a clear separation between manag-
ers and investors. However, the influence of ownership diffusion on  corporate disclosure 
could be related to the increasing role of Italian capital markets and the stronger attention 
made by the regulatory authorities to protect the smaller shareholders after some corporate 
scandals (e.g. Parmalat). Therefore, the managers appear to monitor the agency relation-
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ships with the small shareholders, providing extended information in the annual report. 
On the other hand, the leverage and profitability were found to be unrelated to the in-
dex of disclosure compliance. 
Previous studies consider the level of leverage as one of the explanatory variables of cor-
porate disclosure. However, the empirical evidences provide mixed results. In our study, we 
found no significant association between leverage and the disclosure of Italian firms. Thereby 
in Italian context, the firms tend to create confidential relationships with creditors and lend-
ers, which are in most cases banks. As indicated in previous studies, additional information 
could be provided outside the annual report, through a direct contact with lenders. 
In accounting studies the investigation of influence of profitability on firm disclosure is 
a complex one. With reference to Italy, we found no significant association between profit-
ability and disclosure. From these results it is possible to suggest that managers feel that 
stakeholders, and in particular the investors, are satisfied with good performances achieved 
by firms and they do not require additional information. In this case, it is expected that in 
times of financial crisis, it is more likely that high profitability firms do not want to com-
municate detailed information which could generate a negative impact on their competitive 
advantage. 
This study presents several limitations. Firstly, despite the controls applied throughout 
the content analysis process, the assessment of disclosure items inevitably involves the sub-
jective judgment of the coder. Secondly, this study focused on the amount of information 
offered by Italian firms, without considering its usefulness for investors, analysts and capital 
markets. Thirdly, this study examined a sample of non-financial listed firms in Italy soon 
after the implementation of IFRSps, thus the conclusions cannot be generalized without 
future investigations. Further developments of this study can be achieved by considering 
the following aspects: a larger sample of firms; the consequences of disclosure compliance 
with IASB’s MC; and a longer period of observation. 
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Appendix 1 - List of sample firms 
1.ACEAGAS 24.CAMPARI 47.KMEGROUP 
2.ACQUE POTABILI 25.CARRARO 48.LA DORIA 
3.ALERION 26.CLASS EDITORI0 49.LUXOTTICA 
4.AMPLIFON 27.DE LONGHI 50.MEDIASET 
5.ANSALDO STS 28.EDISON 51.NOEMALIFE 
6.ANTICHI PELLETTIERI 29.EL.EN. 52.PANARIA GROUP 
7.ASTALDI 30.EMAK 53.PIAGGIO 
8.AUTOGRILL 31.ENERVIT 54.PIERREL 
9.AUTOSTRADA TO-MI 32.ERG 55.PININFARINA 
10.AUTOSTRADE 
MERIDIONALI 33.ESPRINET 56.POLIGRAFICI EDITORIALI 
11.BASICNET 34.EUROTECH 57.RENO DE MEDICI 
12.BASTOGI 35.FIDIA 58.RICHARD GINORI 
13.BEGHELLI 36.FIERA MILANO 59.SAIPEM 
14.BEST UNION COMPANY 37.FINMECCANICA 60.SNAI 
15.BIALETTI 38.FULLSIX 61.SNAM RETE GAS 
16.BOERO BARTOLOMEO 39.GREEN VISION AMBIENTE 62.SOGEFI 
17.BREMBO 40.COIN 63.TELECOM ITALIA 
18.BRIOSCHI 41.IL SOLE 24 ORE 64.TERNA 
19.BUONGIORNO VITAMINIC 42.IMA 65.ZIGNAGO 
20.BUZZI 43.IMMSI  
21.CAD IT 44.IMPREGILO  
22.CALEFFI 45.ISAGRO  
23.CALTAGIRONE 46.KINEXIA  
 
Appendix 2 - Disclosure Checklist  
 Disclosure items Source 
 The nature of the business IFRSps 
1. Industries in which the entity operates page 12 
2. Entity’s main markets and competitive position within those markets p.  12 
3. Significant features of the legal, regulatory and macro-economic environments that influence the entity and the mar-kets in which the entity operates p.  12 
4. Entity’s main products and services p.  12 
5. Entity’s main business processes and distribution methods p.  12 
6. Entity’s structure and how it creates value p.  12 
 Management’s objectives and its strategies for meeting those objectives  
7. Management's objectives and strategies pp. 12-13 
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8. Management's actions to achieve their objectives and strategies pp. 12-13 
9. Relationship between objectives, strategy, management actions and executive remuneration pp. 12-13 
 The entity’s most significant resources, risks and relationships  
10. Critical financial resources available to the entity (e.g. entity’s capital structure, financial arrangements, etc.) pp. 13-14 
11. Critical non-financial resources available to the entity (e.g. human and intellectual capital resources, etc.) pp. 13-14 
12. Significant relationships between the entity and main stakeholders pp. 13-14 
13. Entity’s principal (strategic, commercial, financial, operational) risks exposures  pp. 13-14 
 The results of operations and prospects  
14. Explanation of the results achieved by the Entities in the financial condition, liquidity and performance during the 
period and its position 
pp. 14-15 
15. Explanation of the main trends, business segments and factors affecting the entity's performance pp. 14-15 
16. Discussion and analysis of significant changes in financial position, liquidity and performance compared with those of the previous period or periods pp. 14-15 
17. Discussion  of  the targets for the financial measure to achieve pp. 14-15 
18. Discussion of  the targets for the non-financial measure to achieve pp. 14-15 
 The critical performance measures and indicators that management uses 
19. Financial performance indicators that are adopted by management  to manage business and to assess progress 
against its stated objectives 
pp. 15-16 
20. Non-financial performance indicators that are adopted by management  to manage business and to assess progress against its stated objectives pp. 15-16 
21. Comparison of performance indicators (both financial and non financial) adopted during the year to prior periods pp. 15-16 
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